Introduction
Operating system access control mechanisms are intended to protect programs and data from corruption, yet still allow sharing of these resources. The goal is to support a broad range of authorization policies. But at least in commercial operating systems of the last few decades, we find support only for authorization policies concerning operations implemented by the operating system itself; polices concerning operations or resources that applications implement are not supported. This made sense
• when operations provided by the operating system were the sole means by which programs communicated and synchronized, and • when the operating system was small, since positioning the access control mechanism inside the operating system then resulted in a trusted computing base that was small.
Today's applications, however, are increasingly being structured in terms of a base and a set of extensions which augment the functionality of that base 2 and which do not use the operating system for communication and synchronization. In addition, today's operating systems are no longer small. So associating the access control mechanism with an operating system interface has become less sensible.
A misbehaving extension has the potential to compromise the base system it extends because, for performance reasons, extensions are typically executed in the same address space and with the same privileges as the base and, therefore, have access to resources on which the base depends. Moreover, once compromised, a base system might then wreck havoc by abusing its privileges. Examples abound: email containing viruses as executable attachments, Microsoft Word documents bearing hostile macros, and new browser "helper apps" that are a far cry from being helpful.
The situation could be improved if we posit some sort of reference monitor [1] that intercepts all program actions and, based on privileges held by the issuer of the action, blocks those that cause compromise. To make this vision a reality, two technical questions must be solved:
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(1) Implementation of such a reference monitor. (2) Determination of a suitable authorization policy for that reference monitor to enforce.
Regarding (1) , one promising approach is to use a program rewriter that modifies an object program before execution, adding tests that effectively in-line a fine-grained reference monitor [3] . This paper sketches some recent thinking on (2).
What Authorization Policy to Enforce?
Much is gained by allowing a program's privileges to change as execution progresses, with the granularity of privileges rather fine-grained. The benefits were first articulated in 1972 by Roger Needham, writing [4] : "Protection regimes are not constant during the life of a process. They may change as the work proceeds, and in a fully general discussion they should be allowed to change arbitrarily. Statements would be allowed, for example, to the effect that certain segments were only accessible if the value standing in a system microsecond clock were prime. In practice one departs from full generality, and limits those circumstances which may give rise to a change of protection regime."
Three years later, in 1975, Saltzer and Schroeder's formulation of these ideas, today known as the Principle of Least Privilege, was published [5] : "f) Least privilege: Every program and every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job. Primarily, this principle limits the damage that can result from an accident or error. It also reduces the number of potential interactions among privileged programs to the minimum for correct operation, so that unintentional, unwanted, or improper uses of privilege are less likely to occur. Thus, if a question arises related to misuse of a privilege, the number of programs that must be audited is minimized. Put another way, if a mechanism can provide 'firewalls,' the principle of least privilege provides a rationale for where to install the firewalls. The military security rule of 'need-to-know' is an example of this principle."
The Saltzer-Schroeder formulation does not speak explicitly about the granularity of privileges, but actions speak louder than words and their contemporaneous Multics operating system offered a fine-grained access control mechanism as part of its virtual memory system. So, in that sense (and others), Multics can be seen as superior to today's operating systems, with their relatively coarsegrained targets of access control (viz programs and files). The Saltzer-Schroeder formulation also does not explicitly call out the benefits of allowing the set of privileges associated with a program to change as execution progresses, but Multics did provide some support (with its rings of protection) for dynamic authorization policies.
Least Privilege. Policies consistent with the Principle of Least Privilege depend not only on the code to be executed but also on what that code is intended to do. For an extension Ext and some specification Σ Ext , define µPriv(Ext,Σ Ext ) to be the policy 3 that grants the minimum privileges for execution of Ext to satisfy Σ Ext . As an example, a specification Σ Ext for a word processor's spellchecker extension Ext might stipulate that misspelled words be flagged in the word processor's open file F; we would then expect µPriv(Ext,Σ Ext ) to be a policy that gives the spell-checker read (but not write) access to F, read (but not write) access a file containing a spelling dictionary, and read/write access to a file containing user-added spellings for local jargon terms.
Interposition of
(1) The base system could itself compute µPriv(Ext, Σ Ext ).
(2) The base system could fetch µPriv(Ext, Σ Ext ) from elsewhere.
Approach (1) Approach (1) also presumes that Σ Ext is known, and this too is a questionable supposition. Extensions are generally downloaded with some expectation of the job they are intended to do, so one might expect that a known, high-level task-oriented specification Σ Ext was the impetus for downloading Ext. But any specification Σ Ext that is high-level will likely lack the low-level information needed for determining whether Ext accesses only those resources needed for accomplishing its task. For example, recall the spell-checker extension introduced above. A highlevel task-oriented specification for Ext would likely only discuss the single file F where misspellings are to be found. Yet, this extension actually accesses two other files (a spelling dictionary and a jargon dictionary) and might, in addition, access a backing-store file perhaps even remotely over a local network. These low-level implementation details-the two other files and the remote backing store-are not going to be known to the initiator of the Ext download and, therefore, would not be included in high-level task-oriented specification Σ Ext . Yet, clearly, µPriv(Ext, Σ Ext ) would need to include privileges for accessing the spelling dictionary, the jargon dictionary, the network, and the backing-store. So high-level specification Σ Ext lacks information about how Ext works that would be needed for deducing µPriv(Ext, Σ Ext ).
If µPriv(Ext, Σ Ext ) cannot be deduced locally, then perhaps it could be obtained elsewhere. One would need a basis to trust a policy LP (say) gotten that way. Automatically checking LP has the same undecidability problems as automatically computing µPriv(Ext, Σ Ext ); manual inspection of LP requires a human to analyze a complicated policy and a program (Ext) that might only be available in binary form. So, for all intents and purposes, to obtain µPriv(Ext, Σ Ext ) from elsewhere is tantamount to trusting the provider of that policy; and an obvious question, then, is whether trusting a provider of LP is materially different from trusting some provider to offer a secure version of Ext.
And More. So at least for the time being, it seems as though obtaining µPriv(Ext, Σ Ext ) for use by a reference monitor interposed between a base and its extensions is infeasible, and alternatives must be sought. One such alternative, which might be called a Principle of Most Privilege, is to enforce policies that only prevent extensions from subverting the base system or, equivalently, to prevent extensions from destroying the guarantees on which the correct operation of the base depends. Such guarantees include:
• Properties implied by the programming model employed for building the base. For example, the separate address spaces usually accorded to process abstractions bring guarantees about integrity of storage; and type systems in modern programming languages, like Java and C#, bring guarantees about how certain variables can be used.
• Invariants that the base maintains about state. For example, a linked-list data structure might be characterized by an invariant stating which nodes are reachable from each other; each routine to manipulate the data structure is then designed to (i) work correctly if that invariant holds prior to execution and (ii) upon termination, leave the data structure in a state satisfying the invariant.
Notice that with the "most privilege" alternative to enforcing µPriv(Ext, Σ Ext ), a single authorization policy is being employed, independent of extension Ext. The problem of deciding what specification Σ Ext to use with a given extension Ext is thus eliminated. Moreover, provided the guarantees being defended can be expressed as safety 4 properties-and most can--then the guarantees of interest can be enforced by in-line reference monitoring.
Use of a single policy for all extensions implies that the policy being enforced might not be as restrictive as it could be (thereby admitting attacks) or might be too restrictive (thereby ruling-out execution of certain extensions). So instead of enforcing a single policy, we might postulate a small set of categories and associate a separate policy with each. A user or some third party would then classify the intent of each extension in terms of those categories-such as, an editor, a game, or a data viewer; the associated policies would be enforced whenever that extension executes. (Extensions that fall in no category are executed, as before, under a policy that does not take into account the purpose of the extension and thus is probably more restrictive than the other polices.) Note that, although individual users might be the ones to define categories and their associated policies, a priori wide-spread agreement on a small set of categories as being standard would allow code producers to ensure that their extensions satisfy expected policies.
Some Final Comments
The articulation of abstractions and principles is an important facet of doing research in computing systems. An implementation is certainly one way to demonstrate the utility of a new systems abstraction or principle. However, some abstractions are useful even though they cannot be implemented. Belady's optimal page replacement policy [2] , which involves predicting future memory references and therefore is unrealizable in practice, is one example. The Principle of Least Privilege might be another, offering value primarily as a benchmark against which to compare policies that are being enforced-when compared with µPriv(Ext, Σ Ext ), a deployed policy would be considered inferior if it either admits additional attacks or it incorrectly restricts the functionality of Ext.
This paper not only revisits a classic security principle but also revisits a classic abstraction, the reference monitor. Many forms of fine-grained access control that are not practical with traditional reference monitors become practical with in-lined reference monitors. Another concern now confronts us, though: How best to exploit the flexibility. To make progress here, not only must we learn the art of writing policies but we must also develop the mathematical tools for analyzing them. The weak policies entailed by our Principle of Most Privilege are likely to provide workable defenses for broad sets of extensions, for example. Weak policies might well be easier for humans to understand, too. Exactly how these advantages trade with the "security" µPriv(Ext, Σ Ext ) provides is the ultimate question. For the present, however, it seems that practical protection for extensible systems is most easily obtained using policies that grant more privileges than would µPriv(Ext, Σ Ext )-the least privilege and more.
